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UNLAWFUL STATUS AS A 
"CONSTITUTIONAL IRRELEVANCY"?: 
THE EQUAL PROTECTION RIGHTS 
OF ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 
JASON H. LEE· 
In 1982, the Supreme Court decided Plyler v. Doe, the first and only case in which it 
has addressed the level of scrutiny applicable to state classifications of illegal immigrants 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In a complex and 
internally incoherent opinion, the Court declared that unlawful status is not a "constitutional 
irrelevancy" and thus proceeded to hold that classifications based on illegal immigrant status 
deserve only rational-basis review, even though classifications of legal immigrants are 
accorded strict judicial scrutiny. Subsequent courts have since cited to Plyler to uphold 
discriminatory legislation stripping illegal immigrants of basic economic and social benefits. 
With the recent rise in anti-illegal-immigrant sentiment, as evidenced by the passing of 
several state and local laws targeting the undocumented community, there is a serious risk 
that illegal immigrants in America will soon be converted into an outlaw caste, outside of the 
protection of the laws and neglected as nonpersons by those who nevertheless benefit from 
the contributions that they make to American society. The Equal Protection Clause extends 
its protections to all "persons" within the United States' jurisdiction, including those who are 
unlawfully present in this country, and it should be interpreted in a manner that allows it to 
fulfill its universalist textual promise. This Article argues that the Supreme Court should re-
examine its holding in Plyler and find that unlawful status is constitutionally irrelevant in the 
equal-protection context. Put differently, the Supreme Court should apply the same legal 
standard to illegal immigrant classifications that it accords legal immigrant classifications: 
strict-scrutiny review. 
'J.D. 2007, University of California, Berkeley School of Law (Boalt Hall); B.A. 2004, Brown 
University. Thanks to Goodwin Liu, Stephen Lee, Vidhya Prahbakaran, and the editors at the 
GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW for their helpful thoughts and suggestions. I would also 
like to thank Milou for all of her support and care. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent times, arguably no community living within the United 
States has been as politically unpopular as the nation's swelling 
population of undocumented immigrants. 1 These immigrants have been 
accused of sapping government resources,2 engaging in criminal 
behavior,3 overcrowding school classrooms,4 and disrupting the labor 
market by contributing to the lowering of wages as well as by occupying 
jobs that would have otherwise gone to citizens or legal immigrants.5 
The number of illegal immigrants in the United States has skyrocketed 
over the last two decades, reaching an estimated 12 million by 2005.6 
According to some reports, this population grows by as many as 500,000 
people each year.? 
Within the American undocumented community, the vast majority 
hail from Mexico,8 with a sizeable population coming from other Latin 
I I use the terms "illegal immigrant" and "undocumented immigrant" interchangeably 
throughout this Article. They are meant to denote noncitizens who are present in the United States 
without legal permission. These individuals may have initially entered the country without 
authorization or may have entered legally but then overstayed their visas or violated a condition of 
their admission. 
2 See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly, Why Are Taxpayers Providing Hospital Care of lllegal Aliens?, 
HUMAN EVENTS, Aug. 12, 2002, at 9; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 249 (\982) (Burger, C.J., 
dissenting). 
3 See, e.g., Dennis Hollingsworth, Flawed Studies Ignore the Real Impact of Illegal 
Immigration, NORTH COUNTY TIMES, Mar. 10, 2007, 
www.nctimes.comIarticles/2007/03117/perspective/16_28_123_1O_07.txt; Pa. City Gets Tough on 
Immigration; Hazleton, PA., Says Employers And Landlords Of Illegal Immigrants Face Steep 
Fines, Associated Press, July 14, 2006, 
www.cbsnews.comIstories/2006/07/14/national/main 18043 72.shtml. 
4 See, e.g., Thomas R. Ruge & Angela D. Iza, Higher Education for Undocumented 
Students: The Case for Open Admission and In-State Tuition Rates for Students Without Lawful 
Immigration Status, 15 IND. INT'L COMPo L. REv. 257, 276 (2005) ("Opponents argue that ... 
allowing undocumented students to go to college will, in turn, deny opportunities to deserving U.S. 
citizens."). 
5 See, e.g., De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 356-57 (\976) ("Employment of illegal aliens in 
times of high unemployment deprives citizens and legally admitted aliens of jobs; acceptance by 
illegal aliens of jobs on substandard terms as to wages and working conditions can seriously depress 
wage scales and working conditions of citizens and legally admitted aliens .... "). 
6 FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, How MANY ILLEGAL ALIENS?, 
http://www.fairus.orgisite/PageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersb8ca (last visited Apr. 
2, 2008). An estimated thirty-three percent of undocumented immigrants in the United States in 
2000 initially entered the country with some type of authorization. Ruge & lza, supra note 4, at 258. 
7 FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, How MANY ILLEGAL ALIENS?, 
http://www.fairus.orgisitelPageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersb8ca (last visited Apr. 
2,2008). 
8 In 2000, the Census Bureau estimated that there were 3,871,912 undocumented 
immigrants from Mexico living in the United States, while the Immigration and Naturalization 
Service put this number at 4,808,000. Id. 
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American countries,9 Cuba, China, and India. lo It is important to keep in 
mind, however, that undocumented immigrants come, in relatively large 
numbers, from all over the world, including developed nations such as 
the United Kingdom and Germany. I I Once in the United States, illegal 
immigrants tend to settle in California, Texas, and Florida, with large 
numbers also in New York, Arizona, and Illinois.12 
In reaction to the growing size of the illegal immigrant population 
and to common perceptions about this population's negative effects on 
American society, the 1980s and 90s witnessed a surge in anti-illegal-
immigrant hostility. It was during this period that Congress passed the 
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986,13 which, among other 
things, penalizes employers for knowingly hiring unauthorized aliens. 14 
It was also during this period, in 1996, that Congress enacted the 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Actl5 and 
the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act,16 a set 
of laws that cut millions of legal and illegal immigrants off from federal 
benefits programs. 
At the state level, legislators and voters have been equally as active, 
enacting laws designed to strip undocumented immigrants of valuable 
social and economic rights. In 1994, the California electorate passed 
Proposition 187, which prohibited undocumented immigrants from 
receiving public social services, publicly funded health care, public 
elementary and secondary education, and public post-secondary 
education within the state. 17 Although the various provisions of the 
initiative never became effective law and were ultimately found 
unconstitutional under the preemption doctrine,18 the fact that they were 
9 The Census Bureau's estimated number of undocumented immigrants from EI Salvador in 
2000 was 336,717. The number for native Guatemalans was 238,977. [d. 
10 The Census Bureau's estimated number of undocumented immigrants from Cuba, China, 
and India in 2000 was 216,297, 226,886, and 200,306, respectively. [d. 
II The estimated number of United Kingdom citizens living unlawfully in the United States 
in 2000 was 123,246, and the number for German citizens was 113,327, both of which represent 
fairly sizeable populations. [d. 
12 HANS P. JOHNSON, PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA, ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION 4 
(2006), available at http://www.ppic.org/contentipubs/atissue/AC406HJAI.pdf. 
13 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (Westlaw 2007). 
1995). 
14 8 U.S.C.A. § I 324a(a)(2) (Westlaw 2007). 
15 Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996). 
16 Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996). 
17 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 755, 787-90 (C.O. Cal. 
18 In 1997, a federal district court held that "substantially all of the provisions of Proposition 
187" were unconstitutional and thus invalid. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. 
Supp. 1244, 1261 (C.O. Cal 1997). After Gray Davis was elected governor of California in 1998, he 
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passed by a significant majority of California voters serves as a powerful 
example of the strong anti-illegal immigrant sentiment that thrived in the 
mid-1990s. This animus is still alive today; Texas state legislators 
recently considered a bill that would not only deny public services to 
illegal immigrants but also deprive their American-born children of 
birthright citizenship.19 
Finally, over the last several years a number of city and county 
governments have begun to consider restrictive ordinances as well. On 
October 18, 2006, the City of Escondido, California, located in northern 
San Diego County, adopted a law that penalizes "any person or business 
that owns a dwelling unit" that "'let[s], lease[s] or rent[s] a dwelling unit 
to an illegal alien.,,20 In this way, it attempted to exclude illegal 
immigrants from access to a major source of housing and shelter. Earlier 
in 2006, the city council of Hazleton, Pennsylvania, passed a set of laws 
that sought to "deny licenses to businesses that employ illegal 
immigrants, fine landlords $1,000 for each illegal immigrant discovered 
renting their properties, and require city documents to be in English 
only.,,21 
What legal recourse do illegal immigrants have to fight against this 
wave of discriminatory legislation against them? What strategies can 
they pursue to insure their access to basic economic and social services 
such as housing, public education, and medical services? 
With respect to federal classifications of immigrants (both legal and 
illegal immigrants), the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the 
judgments of Congress, citing Congress's constitutional grant of 
dropped the state's appeal of this decision and essentially killed the initiative. 
19 Miguel Bustillo, Texas May Pull Up the Welcome Mat; The State, Long Friendly to Illegal 
Immigrants, Debates Tough Limits, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2007, at AI. Birthright citizenship is 
citizenship conferred upon an individual at the time of his or her birth, as opposed to citizenship 
attained through the formal process of naturalization. 
20 Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38R (Oct. 18, 2006), available at 
http://www.ci.escondido.ca.us/immigrationiOrd-2006-38R.pdf (Establishing Penalties for the 
Harboring of Illegal Aliens in the City of Escondido); see also Garrett v. City of Escondido, 465 F. 
Supp. 2d 1043, 1047-48 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (granting a temporary restraining order barring the city 
from enforcing the ordinance). 
21 Pa. City Gets Tough on Immigration; Hazleton, PA., Says Employers And Landlords Of 
Illegal Immigrants Face Steep Fines, Associated Press, July 14, 2006, 
www.cbsnews.comlstories/2006/07114/national/mainI804372.shtmI.SeeHazleton.Pa .• Ordinance 
2006-13, (Aug. 15,2006) (LandlordlTenant Ordinance); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sep. 21, 
2006) (Illegal Immigration Relief Act Ordinance); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-19 (Sep. 21, 2006) 
(Official English Ordinance). The text of each one of these laws can be retrieved from a website 
established by the Mayor of Hazleton that encourages other small towns to adopt similar ordinances. 
See Small Town Defenders, http://www.smalltowndefenders.comlpublic/node/6 (last visited Apr. 2, 
2008). 
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"plenary power" over issues of immigration.22 Consequently, federal 
action that discriminates against noncitizens almost always survives 
judicial scrutiny.23 The merits of this plenary-power doctrine adopted by 
the Court can be questioned and has been thoughtfully criticized by a 
number ofscholars.24 This article, however, will not address the plenary-
power doctrine or its limitations. 
Instead, this article focuses on state discrimination against illegal 
immigrants and the use of equal-protection doctrine to protect these 
immigrants' rights to enjoy the array of benefits and services offered by 
state governments. There are two main reasons why this article will 
focus on the Equal Protection Clause rather than on federal preemption 
doctrine, which is the other major tool that illegal immigrants can use to 
attack discriminatory state classifications. First, the equal-protection 
doctrine highlights the dignity and membership of an individual in 
American society in a way that the more structural preemption analysis 
does not.25 Second, preemption has become the more common, and 
successful, tactic over the last twenty years, leaving the equal-protection 
approach under-explored and undeveloped since the early 19808. It is 
time to revive the analysis of illegal immigrants' right to strong equal 
protection of the laws, both to highlight their equal moral membership in 
America and because the preemption approach does not always prevail. 
State classifications of immigrants, unlike federal classifications, 
are not protected by the plenary power doctrine. Instead, the Supreme 
Court's alienage cases reason that states typically have no business 
distinguishing between citizens and noncitizens, a strictly federal 
concern, and thus generally subject state alienage classifications to strict-
scrutiny review.26 The caveat for illegal immigrants, however, is that 
22 See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81-83 (1976). 
23 Id. at 83; Michael Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration 
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REv. 493, 496 (2001). 
24 See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the 
Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. I, 1-22, 53-66, 73-74 (1998); Hiroshi 
Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and 
Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990). 
25 Harold Hongju Koh, Equality with a Human Face: Justice Blackmun and the Equal 
Protection of Aliens, 8 HAMLINE L. REV. 51, 98-99 (1985). 
26 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. I, 7, 12 (1977); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
634,642,646 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722-23 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365,371-72 (1971); Wishnie, supra note 23, at 496. Strict scrutiny is the highest level of review 
accorded by the courts to state classifications. In order to survive strict scrutiny, a challenged law 
must be "necessary to achieve a compelling government purpose." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 645 (2d ed. 2002). Otherwise, it will be struck 
down. This is a high standard that usually leads to the invalidation of a challenged statute or 
regulation. Id. 
5
Lee: Equal Protection For Illegal Immigrants
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2008
6 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
they are not accorded the same degree of equal protection of the laws as 
legal immigrants. In Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court declared that 
unlawful status is not a "constitutional irrelevancy.,,27 While the Court 
was not completely clear on the level of review appropriate for 
classifications of illegal immigrants, it is clear that it found strict scrutiny 
inappropriate.28 Moreover, except perhaps for legislation affecting both 
illegal immigrant children and their access to primary and secondary 
education, it appears from the Court's language that it chose to endorse 
the rational-basis standard of review.29 This result is incorrect. Illegal 
immigrant classifications should be held to the same standard of review 
as legal immigrant classifications: strict scrutiny. Contrary to the 
opinion of the Plyler majority, unlawful status should be a constitutional 
irrelevancy. 
This article is organized in the following manner. Part I breaks 
down the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Plyler v. Doe, the first and 
only case in which it addressed the equal-protection status of illegal 
immigrants. In doing so, the article distills the justifications that the 
Court provides for declaring the constitutional relevance of unlawful 
status, which will then serve as the topics of discussion for the rest of the 
article's critiques. Part II reviews four cases from outside the equal-
protection context that conclude that unlawful status is irrelevant to an 
illegal immigrant's right to receive the same protection of the laws as 
citizens and legal immigrants. It then explores and rejects possible 
reasons why the Court chose not to follow the approach adopted by these 
cases, and highlights the importance of according illegal immigrants a 
strong version of the equal protection of the laws. Finally, Part III argues 
that illegal immigrants are morally entitled to the same benefits and 
services provided by states to legal immigrants as well as most of the 
benefits reserved for citizens. This is accomplished through the 
27 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982). There has been recent discussion 
among scholars and in at least one court about whether Congress can devolve its immigration 
powers to the states, a consequence of which would be the extension of the plenary power shield 
from equal-protection liability to state classifications of immigrants. This issue is beyond the scope 
of this article. It is important to point out, however, that the Court of Appeals of New York has 
concluded that Congress may not devolve its plenary power over immigration to the states. Aliessa 
v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2001). Additionally, scholars and practitioners have 
argued against the legality and prudence of devolution. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 23, at 496; 
Ellen M. Yacknin, "Migration Regulation Goes Local: The Role 0/ States in u.s. Immigration 
Policy": Aliessa and Equal Protection/or Immigrants, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 391 (2002). 
28 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219 n.19. 
29 See discussion in Part I, below. Rational-basis review "is the minimum level of scrutiny 
that all laws challenged under equal protection must meet." CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, at 645. Under this standard, "a law will be upheld if it is rationally 
related to a legitimate government purpose." Id. at 646. 
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articulation and application of a participation model of rights that stresses 
the moral significance of an individual's membership within a society 
rather than his or her status as a citizen or legal immigrant. 
I. PLYLER V. DOE: UNLAWFUL STATUS AS CONSTITUTIONALLY 
RELEVANT 
In Graham v. Richardson, decided in 1971, the Supreme Court 
established that the Equal Protection Clause requires that state 
classifications of legal immigrants in the United States be held to the 
standard of strict-scrutiny review.30 It reasoned that "classifications 
based on alienage, like those based on nationality or race, are inherently 
suspect and subject to close judicial scrutiny.,,3! Highlighting the 
traditional powerlessness of aliens, who as a class lack the ability to vote 
and thus directly influence the political process, the Court further noted 
that legal "[a]liens ... are a prime example of. .. 'discrete and insular' 
minorit[ies] for whom such heightened judicial solicitude is 
appropriate.,,32 This decision has been applauded by several immigration 
and constitutional law scholars, not just because it protects the rights of a 
politically weak and historically abused group,33 but also because it 
recognizes the fact that legal immigrants contribute much to American 
society and, in many ways, resemble citizens in their daily actions. As 
noted by the Court in Graham, "Aliens like citizens pay taxes and may 
be called into the armed forces .... [They] may live within a state for 
many years, work in the state and contribute to the economic growth of 
the state.,,34 Indeed, due to the fact that oftentimes very little 
distinguishes the activities and contributions of citizens and legal 
immigrants except for their official status, Alexander Aleinikoff, Dean of 
the Georgetown University Law Center, has aptly referred to such 
immigrants as "citizens-in-training" who should be accorded near-equal 
treatment as full citizens, including a wide range of economic and social 
rights.35 
In contrast to the Supreme Court's provision of strong equal-
30 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971). 
31 ld. at 372. 
32 1d. 
33 See Wishnie, supra note 23, at 555 ("[TJhere are reasons to be particularly concerned 
about anti-immigrant discrimination at the state or local level. Subfederal alienage classifications 
have an extensive history."). 
34 Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. 
35 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Tightening Circle of Membership, 22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 
915,921 (1995). 
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protection rights to legal aliens, the Court has historically treated illegal 
immigrants in a less favorable manner. Despite the fact that the 
Fourteenth Amendment has been found to apply to all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States, including illegal immigrants,36 the Court 
held in Plyler v. Doe that illegal immigrants are not a "suspect class.,,37 
It reasoned that undocumented status was not a "constitutional 
irrelevancy,,,38 and thus determined that state classifications based on the 
status of illegal alienage are subject to a lower standard of review than 
the strict scrutiny accorded to classifications of legal immigrants. 39 
Instead, the Plyler Court applied an intermediate level of review, 
requiring the state to prove that the legislation under review - a Texas 
law denying undocumented children access to a free public education40 -
furthered some "substantial goal.,,41 It justified this intermediate level of 
scrutiny by reasoning that illegal immigrant children did not choose to 
come to the United States but instead were brought into the country by 
their parents.42 The Court thus did not find these children morally 
culpable or responsible for their illegal status.43 Additionally, the Plyler 
majority highlighted the importance of an education for children, arguing 
that prohibiting an illegal immigrant child from attaining a free public 
education would condemn him or her to a stigmatized and socially and 
economically marginalized life.44 In this way the Court created a unique 
justification for the use of an intermediate level of review that was 
inconsistent with previously established equal-protection doctrine.45 
This part of the majority's holding, however, has been both criticized by 
36 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215 (1982). 
37 [d. at 219 n.19. 
38 [d. 
39 See id. 
40 [d. at 205. 
41 [d. at 224. 
42 [d. at 220. 
43 [d. 
44 [d. at 223. The Supreme Court elaborated on its concern for educating illegal immigrant 
youths by stating: 
!d. 
Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship on a discrete class of children not accountable for 
their disabling status. The stigma of illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their lives. By 
denying these children a basic education, we deny them the ability to live within the structure 
of our civic institutions, and foreclose any realistic possibility that they will contribute in 
even the smallest way to the progress of our Nation. 
45 See id. at 243 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court's opinion rests on such a unique 
confluence of theories and rationales that it will likely stand for little beyond the results in these 
particular cases."); Dennis J. Hutchinson, More Substantive Equal Protection? A Note on Plyler v. 
Doe, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 167, 169 (1982). 
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scholars46 and interpreted narrowly by subsequent courts as limited to its 
specific facts (a state classification affecting illegal immigrant children 
and their access to public education).47 Indeed, no court has applied 
intermediate review to a classification of illegal immigrants except in 
Plyler. 
Plyler has instead been cited principally for its more negative view 
toward adult illegal immigrants. In this way, lower courts have 
interpreted Plyler's declaration of the constitutional relevancy of 
unlawful status to mean that state classifications of illegal immigrants are 
due only rational-basis review, at least with respect to state action 
affecting illegal immigrants older than eighteen and outside the 
kindergarten-to-twelfth-grade education context.48 That is, such 
classifications need to bear only "some fair relationship to a legitimate 
public purpose,,,49 an extremely easy standard to meet, which has been 
employed in numerous cases since Plyler to uphold local legislation 
designed to exclude illegal immigrants from benefits available to citizens 
and other categories of immigrants. 50 For example, since Plyler, lower 
courts have cited to its less favorable equal-protection ruling to uphold a 
state law that prohibits the issuance of state drivers' licenses to illegal 
immigrants,51 to find that a state's denial of vocational rehabilitation to 
undocumented workers did not violate the Equal Protection Clause,52 and 
to conclude that a state regulation excluding illegal immigrants from 
46 See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Equal Protection, Judicial Activism, and the Intellectual 
Agenda of the Constitutional Theory: Reflections on, and Beyond, Plyler v. Doe, 44 U. PITT. L. REv. 
329,339-40 (1983) (observing several flaws in the Plyler majority's opinion and accusing the Court 
of improper judicial activism). But see Gerald Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, 
Proposition 187, and the Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. REV. 1425, 1443-44 
(1995) (noting that the Plyler majority adopted an intermediate level of review for legislation 
affecting undocumented immigrant children and approving of this development in equal-protection 
doctrine). 
47 See, e.g., State v. Cosio, 858 P.2d 621, 627 (Alaska 1993) (narrowly interpreting Plyler's 
intermediate review holding and rejecting the illegal immigrant plaintiffs' equal-protection claim, 
noting that they are both adults and that the permanent fund dividend that they sought was not 
"comparable to education"); Am. G.l. Forum v. Miller, 267 Cal. Rptr. 371,376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990) 
("The[] factors of nonaccountability for status and lifetime hardship are not present here. Therefore, 
the test in this case is whether collecting and disseminating 'undocumented person' information 
'bears some fair relationship to a legitimate public purpose."'); Linda S. Bosniak, Membership, 
Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047, 1124-26 (1994). 
48 See, e.g., Cosio, 858 P.2d at 627; Am. G.I. Forum, 267 Cal. Rptr. at 376; Bosniak, supra 
note 47, at 1124-26. 
49 Plylerv. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
50 See Linda S. Bosniak, Exclusion and Membership: The Dual Identity o/the Undocumented 
Worker Under United States Law, 1988 WIS. L. REv. 955, 984 (1988). 
51 Doe No.1 v. Georgia Dep't of Pub. Safety, 147 F. Supp. 2d 1369,1373,1376 (N.D. Ga. 
2001). 
52 Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 182-83 (Nev. 2001). 
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eligibility to receive permanent fund dividends was permissible. 53 
In contrast to the Supreme Court's view of undocumented 
children's moral innocence, it used rather bold language to describe the 
impropriety of adult illegal immigrants' choices to violate American 
immigration laws, and suggested that they have no right to feel entitled 
to receive any of the benefits provided by a state to its residents. 54 The 
Court noted, "Persuasive arguments support the view that a State may 
withhold its beneficence from those whose very presence within the 
United States is the product of their own unlawful conduct.,,55 It further 
declared that "undocumented status is not irrelevant to any proper 
legislative goaL... [N]or is undocumented status an absolutely 
immutable characteristic since it is the product of conscious ... unlawful 
action.,,56 It is this tone and view of the Court that informs unlawful 
status's alleged constitutional relevance, not the more sympathetic 
language that the Court employed when discussing illegal immigrant 
children and education. 
In order to justify its different constitutional treatment of legal and 
illegal immigrants, the Plyler Court relied primarily on the fact that 
illegal immigrants are within the United States without official 
government permission. 57 According to the Court, "those who elect to 
enter our territory by stealth and in violation of our law should be 
prepared to bear the consequences" of their actions,58 which include 
deportation and exclusion from certain state benefits. Chief Justice 
Burger's dissent articulated this line of reasoning more bluntly: "By 
definition, illegal aliens have no right whatever to be here, and the state 
may reasonably, and constitutionally, elect not to provide them with 
governmental services at the expense of those who are lawfully in the 
state.,,59 
The Plyler Court also articulated a second justification for 
distinguishing between state classifications of legal and illegal 
immigrants - a state's interest in protecting its economy and preserving 
its limited financial resources.60 While recognizing that "the relationship 
between the alien and this country" is normally an exclusive federal 
53 Cosio, 858 P.2d at 626-29. 
54 See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20. 
55 [d. at 219. 
56 [d. at 220. 
57 See id. at 219. 
58 [d. at 219-20. 
59 [d. at 250 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
60 [d. at 229 n.23. 
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interest and thus irrelevant to legislation by a state,61 the Court referred to 
its reasoning in De Canas v. Bica,62 a federal preemption case that it 
decided six years earlier, and concluded: "Despite the exclusive federal 
control of this Nation's borders, we cannot conclude that the States are 
without any power to deter the influx of persons entering the United 
States against federal law, and whose numbers might have a discernible 
impact on traditional state concems.,,63 Such state concerns, according to 
the Court, include a state's ability to provide important government 
services to its residents and to make sure that it has a healthy economy.64 
Thus, even though De Canas was a federal preemption case, the Plyler 
Court adopted De Canas's distinction between state action affecting 
legal and illegal immigrants as part of new equal-protection doctrine. 
Upon initial inspection, the Court's justifications for providing 
illegal immigrants a weaker set of rights under the Equal Protection 
Clause than legal immigrants seems to make sense. After all, the Equal 
Protection Clause was designed to "protect against arbitrary and 
irrational classifications,,65 and it can be argued that the classification of 
illegal immigrants in a group distinct from, and less favored than, legal 
immigrants is both principled and rational. Technically speaking, legal 
and illegal immigrants are not similarly situated in the United States. 
One group is present with the official permission of the U.S. government 
while the other group is not. Upon deeper consideration, however, the 
Supreme Court's distinction between legal and illegal immigrants begins 
to lose much of its force doctrinally, morally, and empirically. 
The remainder of this article examines a variety of reasons why the 
Court should revisit its holding in Plyler regarding state classifications of 
illegal immigrants outside the context of children and their access to 
public education. However, unlike those who think that the Court should 
adopt a lower standard of rational-basis review,66 this article argues that 
the Supreme Court should treat legal and illegal immigrants as 
indistinguishable, and thus accord illegal immigrant classifications strict 
judicial scrutiny. 
61 Id. at 225 (citation omitted). 
62 De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976). 
63 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 229 n.23. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. at 245 (Burger, C.1., dissenting). 
66 See, e.g., Perry, supra note 46, at 339-40. 
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II. THE ANOMALOUS ROLE OF UNLAWFUL STATUS IN EQUAL-
PROTECTION DOCTRINE 
[Vol. 39 
The following discussion lays out a first set of objections against the 
Supreme Court's holding in Plyler. By examining a group of cases from 
lower courts, this section highlights that unlawful status, standing alone, 
has consistently been held to be irrelevant in a variety of legal contexts, 
and that the U.S. Supreme Court provides no principled explanation for 
treating the issue of unlawful status differently in the equal-protection 
realm than in others. Moreover, this section reveals that the Court's 
improper decision to treat equal-protection doctrine as unique has 
significant consequences, as it essentially allows illegal immigrants to be 
considered outlaws, free to be abused as members of a special caste in 
American society. 
A. LEGAL TREND OUTSIDE OF THE EQUAL-PROTECTION CONTEXT 
While the Supreme Court in Plyler explicitly declared the 
immigration status of illegal immigrants relevant (and determinative) 
when deciding their legal rights, there exists a long line of state and 
federal cases, addressing diverse areas of the law outside the realm of 
equal protection, that have concluded otherwise.67 For example, over the 
last half century, state and federal courts have held that illegal 
immigrants possess the right to sue in tort and contract, bring actions for 
divorce, recover workers' compensation, receive due process oflaw, and 
seek relief under federal labor-protection statutes, regardless of their 
unlawful presence within the nation's borders.68 In these cases, various 
courts found the fact that illegal immigrants do not have the 
government's permission to be in the country not to be determinative, a 
fact that the Plyler Court found to be the most important reason for 
providing such individuals weaker equal-protection rights than are 
provided to legal immigrants. As this article discusses below, some 
67 See, e.g., In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168, 170 (5th Cir. 1987); Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d 
1300, 1308 (5th Cir. 1981); Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep't of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1087, 1094 (Kan. 
2007); Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1105-06 (N. J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979); 
Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1258-60 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006). 
68 Bosniak, supra note 50, at 978-82; see, e.g., Commercial Standard Fire & Marine Co. v. 
Galindo, 484 S.W.2d 635.637 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) ("We conclude that a person residing in this 
State whose entry may be contrary to the immigration laws is not barred, by that reason alone, from 
receiving workmen's compensation benefits."); Comment, Equal Protection for Undocumented 
Aliens, 5 CHICANO L. REv. 29, 45-48 (1982) (discussing a range of cases in which courts have 
decided to grant undocumented immigrants the same protection of the laws as citizens and legal 
immigrants). 
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courts69 have continued to insist on the irrelevancy of illegal status even 
in the face of recent precedent that appears to state the contrary.70 
In Moreau v. Oppenheim, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed a district court judgment in favor of plaintiffs who were 
unlawfully present in the United States on five separate causes of action, 
including fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, and tortious 
interference with business and contractual relations.71 In doing so, it 
rejected the defendant's contention that the plaintiffs' illegal status 
rendered their legal claims invalid. The defendant argued, with respect 
to the plaintiffs' tortious interference claims, that "as illegal aliens, 
[plaintiffs] had no right to come into federal court and demand damages 
for 'what (they) could have earned by entering into and performing 
illegal employment in violation of the regulations and laws of the United 
States. ".12 The Fifth Circuit, however, disagreed. 73 In holding for the 
plaintiffs, it reasoned: "We seriously doubt whether illegal entry, 
standing alone, makes outlaws of individuals, permitting their contracts 
to be breached without legal accountability.,,74 The appellate court's use 
of the term "outlaw" here is telling. It suggests a principle adopted by 
the court that one illegal act, such as being in the country without official 
permission, does not make a member of society an outlaw for all 
purposes.75 . 
The Fifth Circuit's use of the term outlaw is of note for another 
reason as well. It foreshadows Professor Gerald Neuman's concern, 
articulated twenty-four years later, that applying only rational-basis 
review to state classifications of illegal immigrants will effectively 
convert such immigrants into outlaws, "non-person[s]. .. outside the 
protection of the legal system.,,76 According to Neuman, affording 
illegal immigrants only rational-basis equal protection will leave states 
free to cut the undocumented population from all kinds of important 
69 I chose the four cases to examine in this section, out of the many that have found unlawful 
status irrelevant to an individual's right to certain benefits of the law, because each one does a good 
job highlighting a particular benefit of disregarding unlawful status or harm from recognizing its 
significance. 
70 It is important to note that this recent precedent in no way represented an announcement 
by the Supreme Court of a constitutional principle recognizing the relevance of unlawful status. 
Instead, it involved a federal statute targeting illegal immigrant employment, which Congress was 
permitted to enact, despite its clear discriminatory effects, under the plenary power doctrine. See 
Hoffinan Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 148-49 (2002). 
71 Moreau v. Oppenheim, 663 F.2d 1300, 1304-05 (5th Cir. 1981). 
72 [d. at 1307. 
73 [d. at 1308. 
74 [d. 
75 The Rights of Undocumented Aliens, 96 HARV. L REv. 1433, 1454 (1983). 
76 See Neuman, supra note 46, at 1441-44. 
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government services that are necessary to secure a humane livelihood. 
As an extreme example, he suggests that even excluding illegal 
immigrants from basic services such as police protection and the 
prosecution of crimes committed against them would pass constitutional 
muster under a rational-basis regime.77 Paralleling the logic expressed 
by the Plyler dissent,78 which advocated strongly for rational-basis 
review of illegal-immigrant classifications, Neuman points out that such 
services "have incremental costs, and they create marginal incentives" 
for other individuals to try to illegally immigrate to the United States.79 
Thus, it seems reasonable to suggest that the Plyler dissent would deem 
the extreme actions of depriving illegal immigrants of police protection 
and other basic services as possessing a fair relationship to legitimate 
state goals.8o This is particularly so given that Chief Justice Burger's 
dissent notes that "the Equal Protection Clause does not mandate that a 
state choose either the most effective and all-encompassing means of 
addressing a problem or none at all.,,81 
Such treatment of a segment of American society, however, would 
seem to violate the basic principles of equality and dignity underlying the 
Equal Protection Clause.82 Converting illegal immigrants into outlaws 
"would deny them the minimal respect for their humanity that the state 
owes even to criminals - and even to criminals whose crimes are more 
serious than the immigration violations of which 'illegal' aliens may be 
guilty.,,83 The Plyler majority noted the development of a permanent 
caste of illegal immigrants living and working in the United States, a so-
called shadow population. 84 Denying illegal immigrants strong equal 
protection of the laws, especially given the long history of anti-illegal-
immigrant treatment within the law85 and more recent proposals to limit 
77 [d. at 1447. 
78 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 250 (1982) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Without laboring what 
will undoubtedly seem obvious to many, it simply is not 'irrational' for a state to conclude that it 
does not have the same responsibility to provide benefits for persons whose very presence in the 
state and this country is illegal as it does to provide for persons lawfully present."). 
79 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1447. 
80 In his dissent, Chief Justice Burger reasons: "The Texas law might also be justified as a 
means of deterring unlawful immigration. While regulation of immigration is an exclusively federal 
function, a state may take steps, consistent with federal immigration policy, to protect its economy 
and ability to provide governmental services from the 'deleterious effects' of a massive influx of 
illegal immigrants." Plyler, 457 U.S. at 249 n.l 0 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
81 [d. 
82 See Kenneth L. Karst, Equal Citizenship Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 91 HARV. L. 
REv. 1,4-8 (1977). 
83 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1448. 
84 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 218-19. 
85 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1448 n.109; Wishnie, supra note 23, at 555. 
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illegal immigrants' access to basics for survival such as housing86 and 
employment,87 will only ensure that this shadow population will remain 
perpetually destitute and susceptible to various kinds of abuse. Most 
members of this caste will not just leave the United States and return to 
their home countries after being denied access to government services. 
The majority of illegal immigrants come to the United States not for the 
benefits provided by the government to its residents but for jobs, 88 which 
will always illicitly be available for immigrants to occupy, whether it is 
serving as a busboy at a restaurant, a janitor at a hospital, or working in 
agricultural fields. Moreover, many illegal immigrants have come to the 
United States to escape persecution or extreme poverty at home. Such 
individuals will not just pack up their items and leave the country once 
they find that they no longer have access to certain state-provided 
benefits. Rather, they will remain - poor, abused, and forgotten -
members of the shadow population that the Plyler Court was so 
concerned about. 
Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co. is another notable case in which a 
court found an illegal immigrant's unlawful presence in the United States 
irrelevant when deciding whether he was entitled to certain protections of 
the law.89 In Montoya, the plaintiff initially entered the United States as 
a "visitor for pleasure" but then remained in the country despite never 
receiving official permission to do SO.90 He eventually began taking on 
employment and ended up working at one job for over a year until he 
was prevented from doing so by injuries suffered in a serious automobile 
accident.91 The plaintiff sought to exercise the personal-injury-protection 
provisions of his automobile insurance plan to recover medical costs and 
income lost as a result of his injuries.92 When his insurance company 
refused to cover all of these expenses, the two parties ended up in court 
where the insurance company based its defense on the plaintiffs illegal 
86 See Pa. City Gets Tough on Immigration; Hazleton. PA., Says Employers And Landlords 
Of Illegal Immigrants Face Steep Fines, Associated Press, July 14, 2006, 
www.cbsnews.com/stories/2006/07 114/nationallmain 18043 n.shtml. 
87 See id. (discussing proposed local legislation that "would deny licenses to businesses that 
employ illegal immigrants"). 
88 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 228 ("The dominant incentive for illegal entry into the State of Texas is 
the availability of employment; few if any illegal immigrants come to this country, or presumably to 
the State of Texas, in order to avail themselves of a free education."); Ruge & Iza, supra note 4, at 
276 (noting that the "availability of public welfare benefits is not what attracts immigrant families to 
the Untied States"). 
89 Montoya v. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1105-06 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1979). 
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immigration status. The appellate court, however, like the Fifth Circuit 
in Moreau, denied the significance of illegal alienage.93 In so holding, it 
made a number of interesting and important observations. As part of its 
defense, the insurance company argued that the plaintiff could not 
recover on his insurance policy because he could not possibly be said to 
be "in an occupational status" at the time of the accident since, at the 
time, he was prohibited by the law from engaging in gainful pursuits.94 
As policyholders were required to be in an occupational status in order to 
recover certain losses, contended the insurance company, the plaintiff 
was not eligible to recover on his pOlicy.95 The appellate court disagreed 
with this reasoning and concluded that the plaintiffs "illegal presence 
and his disability from engaging in gainful pursuits cannot, consistent 
with the plain and ordinary meaning of the policy language, be held to 
deprive him of occupational status.,,96 The court also rejected the 
defendant's claim, based on "obscure considerations of public policy," 
that the plaintiffs unlawful status, in and of itself, prohibited him from 
prevailing on his automobile-insurance claim.97 
Montoya is significant not only because it forgave and overlooked 
the plaintiffs illegal status when deciding his legal claim, but also 
because it appears to have recognized, and attempted to find a just 
accommodation for, the reality that there are millions of undocumented 
immigrants living and working within America's borders. Despite 
border enforcement and other laws aimed at controlling the tide of illegal 
immigration, the fact remains that illegal immigrants are here in the 
country and are interacting with employers, landlords, and all other 
segments of society on a daily basis. To deprive these individuals of 
legal recourse for wrongs that they have suffered would create an 
incentive for their abuse by others98 and would also violate basic norms 
of fairness and equality underlying the Equal Protection Clause. The 
language used by the Montoya court recognizes the idea that illegal 
immigrants may be in this country against the law, but the bottom line is 
that they are here and thus should be accorded certain rights and 
protections so that they will not develop into an outlaw class of 
individuals accorded a lower degree of humanity than everyone else in 
the United States. 
93 1d. at 1103-05. 
94 Id. at 1105. 
95 Id. at 1104-05. 
96 1d. at 1105. 
97 See id. at 1104. 
98 See id. ("Insurance companies may well be encouraged to insure [illegal immigrants) in 
anticipation of being able to renege with impunity after a covered loss has occurred."). 
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A third case of interest is In re Reyes,99 in which the Fifth Circuit 
discussed the relevancy of unlawful status with respect to coverage by 
the Migrant and Seasonal Agricultural Worker Protection Act 
("A WPA") 100 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA,,).lOl In 
that case, the court of appeals held that the protections of both the 
A WPA and FLSA applied to citizens, legal immigrants, and illegal 
immigrants alike. l02 It reached this conclusion despite the fact that the 
A WPA specifically prohibits the employment of illegal immigrants by 
farmers and farm-labor contractors. 103 The court of appeals also found 
unpersuasive the argument that allowing illegal immigrants to recover 
benefits on par with legal workers would undercut the statute's policy 
goal of deterring further illegal immigration of farm workers. l04 As a 
result, the Fifth Circuit issued a writ of mandamus prohibiting the lower 
court from entering a discovery order that would have required the 
plaintiffs to reveal their immigration statuses to the COurt. l05 Since the 
A WP A and FLSA were deemed to cover illegal immigrants, the 
plaintiffs' answers to the discovery order questions regarding their legal 
statuses were irrelevant. Moreover, given the irrelevant nature of the 
discovery order, the court of appeals worried that it would only serve to 
inhibit certain migrant workers from pursuing their rights because of the 
possibility that they may be targeted for deportation. lO6 Thus, the Fifth 
Circuit ruled that undocumented immigrants had the right to utilize 
certain labor-protection laws even though those very laws prohibited the 
hiring of illegal immigrants. This represents a powerful commitment by 
the court to the protection of immigrant workers' rights, including the 
rights of the undocumented. It recognizes the humanity and vulnerability 
of undocumented farm workers who are often subject to abuse by their 
employers. Like the court in Montoya, the Fifth Circuit, in disregarding 
the fact that the A WP A actually prohibits the hiring of illegal 
immigrants, adopted the attitude that while illegal immigrants may be 
present within our borders unlawfully, this does not mean that they 
99 In re Reyes, 814 F.2d 168 (1987). 
100 29 U.S.C.A. § 1801-1872 (Westlaw 2007). 
101 29 U.S.C.A. § 201-219 (Westlaw 2007). 
102 In re Reyes, 814 F.2d at 170. 
103 See id. at 171-72 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
104 See id. at 172 (Jones, J., dissenting). 
105 Id. at 171. The original discovery order entered by the district court asked the plaintiffs to 
answer the following questions: "Are you a citizen of the United States? Ifso, were you born in the 
United States? If so, please state where you were born and your birthdate. If you are a naturalized 
citizen of the United States, please state where and when you became a citizen of the United States. 
If you are not a citizen of the United States, please state your immigration status." Id. at 170. 
106 See id. at 170. 
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should be completely stripped of all legal protections. That would allow 
such immigrants to be discriminated against and wronged freely, a result 
that would offend the spirit of the Constitution. 107 
The body of state and federal cases in support of the irrelevancy of 
an illegal immigrant's unlawful status has continued to grow even after 
the rash of anti-immigrant and anti-illegal-immigrant legislation that was 
passed during the 1980s and 90s. For example, in 1986 Congress 
enacted the Immigration Reform and Control Act ("IRCA"),108 which 
sought to prohibit immigrants from working in the United States without 
government authorization 109 and also penalized employers for knowingly 
hiring unauthorized immigrants. 1 10 Based on this legislation, in 2002 the 
Supreme Court held, in Hoffman Plastics Compounds, Inc. v. National 
Labor Relations Board, that allowing the National Labor Relations 
Board to award back pay to illegal immigrants for their improper 
termination would conflict with the explicit statutory goals of the IRCA 
and was thus impermissible. III The Court reasoned that any conclusion 
to the contrary would only "encourage the successful evasion of 
apprehension by immigration authorities, condone prior violations of the 
immigration laws, and encourage future violations.,,1l2 This was very 
powerful language against the awarding of back pay and federal labor 
remedies to illegal immigrants. While it was not a declaration of the 
relevancy of unlawful status as a constitutional principle, it reflected 
strong Congressional action against illegal immigration that the Supreme 
Court accorded great deference. Even with this legislative and recent 
doctrinal history, however, the Court of Appeals of New York, in 2006, 
concluded that the unauthorized status of an illegal immigrant did not 
preclude her from recovering lost earnings under New York State labor 
laws. 113 In Balbuena v. IDR Realty LLC, the high court of New York 
held that a state law awarding an illegal immigrant past wages and future 
losses of earnings due to an accident suffered while working was not 
preempted by the IRCA. 114 The court distinguished Balbuena from 
Hoffman Plastics, decided just four years earlier by the Supreme 
107 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1448 ("Like the perpetuation of a caste, the transformation of 
unlawful entrants into outlaws who could be mistreated with impunity would violate the core 
historical purpose of the Equal Protection Clause."). 
108 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a (Westlaw 2007). 
109 8 U.S.C.A. § 1324a(h)(3) (Westlaw 2007). 
110 8 U.S.C.A. § I 324a(a)(2) (Westlaw 2007). 
III Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151-52 (2002). 
I I2 Id. at 151. 
113 Balbuena v. lOR Realty LLC, 845 N.E.2d 1246, 1258-60 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2006). 
114 [d. at 1255-58. 
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Court. I 15 It then declared: "We recognize, of course, that plaintiffs' 
presence in this country without authorization is impermissible under 
federal law. Standing alone, however, this transgression is insufficient to 
justify denying plaintiffs a portion of the damages to which they are 
otherwise entitled." 116 
More recently, in Coma Corp. v. Kansas Department of Labor, the 
Supreme Court of Kansas held that an undocumented worker was 
eligible to receive not just compensatory damages for his employer's 
failure to pay him wages that he had earned but also statutory penalty 
damages authorized by a Kansas wage-hour law.1l7 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court rejected the defendant employer's claim that the 
plaintiff was precluded from bringing his lawsuit by both the IRCA and 
Hoffman Plastics. I IS 
Balbuena and Coma Corp. reveal two important points. First, they 
represent the insistence with which some courts have declared the 
irrelevancy of unlawful status in areas of the law outside the equal-
protection doctrine. Second, they reveal that this trend has continued 
from the days of Moreau in the 1970s to 2007 when Coma Corp. was 
decided. 
B. SEARCHING FOR THE SUPREME COURT'S UNARTICULATED 
JUSTIFICATION FOR TREATING EQUAL-PROTECTION DOCTRINE AS 
DIFFERENT FROM OTHER AREAS OF THE LAW 
The above discussion reveals that for the last half-century, state and 
federal courts have been recognizing illegal immigrants' rights to enjoy 
the protection of a wide range of laws on the same basis as all other 
members of American society. Yet the Court in Plyler v. Doe chose not 
to follow this path when considering the scope of the Equal Protection 
Clause. This section explores potential distinctions that the Plyler Court 
may have drawn between the line of cases declining to recognize the 
115 The Court of Appeals of New York pointed out that unlike in Hoffman Plastics, where the 
undocumented immigrant plaintiff committed a criminal act under the IRCA by providing his 
employer with fraudulent identifying documents, the plaintiffs in Balbuena did not commit a 
criminal act under the IRCA. Id. at 1258. The Balbuena court noted that the plaintiffs in its case did 
not produce any false documents to gain employment and were never asked by their employers to 
present work authorization documents as required by the lRCA. It then highlighted the fact that the 
")RCA does not make it a crime to work without documentation." Id. The Court of Appeals of New 
York essentially limited Hoffman Plastics to the facts in that case and narrowed the reach of the 
Hoffman Plastics holding. Id. 
116 1d. 
1\7 See Coma Corp. v. Kan. Dep't of Labor, 154 P.3d 1080, 1087, 1094 (Kan. 2007). 
1\8 See id. at 1083-84. 
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relevancy of unlawful status and its holding in Plyler. After concluding 
that these explanations are unsatisfactory, it examines and responds to 
concerns raised by Professors Michael Perry and Peter Schuck, both of 
whose critiques support Plyler's endorsement of rational-basis review for 
most state illegal-immigrant classifications. 
1. Exploring Some Initial Explanations 
In contrast to the cases discussed above, why did the Plyler majority 
decide to hold that in the equal-protection realm, "undocumented status 
is [not] a 'constitutional irrelevancy",?119 Why did the Supreme Court 
conclude in Plyler that unlawful presence, in and of itself, affects an 
individual's expectation of legal protections while several other courts 
have, in contexts outside the Equal Protection Clause, found unlawful 
presence completely irrelevant? The Court itself does not directly 
provide an answer to these questions. 
The Supreme Court's distinction between legal and illegal 
immigrants is even less understandable when one considers that states, 
unlike the federal government, typically do not have a legitimate 
constitutional interest in evaluating the relationship between an alien and 
the United States when drafting legislation. '20 As the Court noted in 
Nyquist v. Mauclet, one of its most prominent alienage cases, "Congress, 
as an aspect of its broad power over immigration and naturalization, 
enjoys rights to distinguish among aliens that are not shared by the 
states." 121 
Additionally, illegal immigrants share several of the same key 
characteristics of legal immigrants that the Court felt justified the 
application of strict-scrutiny review of state classifications of this latter 
group. In Graham v. Richardson, the Court declared that "[a]liens as a 
class are a prime example of a 'discrete and insular' minority for whom 
heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.,,122 Legal immigrants, who 
do not have the right to vote, often lack effective means to influence the 
political process and are thus subject to political abuse by the states. 
119 Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19 (1982). 
120 Nyquist v. Maudet, 432 U.S. I, 7 n.8 (1977); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 84-87 (1976). 
121 Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 7 n.8. The Supreme Court has held that only in a narrow set of 
circumstances do states ever have a legitimate interest in even distinguishing its residents based on 
their immigration status. This "political function" exception applies when distinguishing between 
citizens and aliens "is fundamental to the definition and government of a state." Ambach v. 
Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75 (1979). This exception has been used to justify state distinctions between 
aliens and citizens with respect to eligibility to hold public office, as well non-elective executive, 
legislative, and judicial positions. Id. at 74. 
122 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (citation omitted). 
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Similarly, illegal immigrants' unrepresented status, and the strong 
popular sentiment against them, renders their community particularly 
susceptible to discriminatory state and local action. 123 Like legal 
immigrants, illegal immigrants are "subject to disadvantages not shared 
by the remainder of the community .... are not entitled to vote and ... 
are often handicapped by a lack of familiarity with our language and 
customs.,,124 States' rising frustration with the federal government's 
inability to slow the pace of illegal immigration presents an even 
stronger reason to be concerned that unrepresented illegal immigrants 
will be the victims of draconian sub-federallegislation.125 
Of course, one major difference between the cases finding unlawful 
status irrelevant and cases involving state classifications of illegal 
immigrants is that the former set of cases involved private disputes and 
wrongs for which the courts allowed illegal immigrants to seek judicial 
relief, while the latter set of cases typically involve the provision of 
benefits by a state to its residents. By providing illegal immigrants 
remedies for private disputes and wrongs, courts allow illegal immigrants 
to collect damages and seek justice from private actors such as 
employers and insurance companies. State and local governments do not 
have to pay any of the direct costs of the illegal immigrants' recoveries 
except for the administrative costs of allowing access to the courts. 126 
On the other hand, in most Fourteenth Amendment equal-protection 
cases it is the state that bears the expenses of a plaintiffs victory. This 
means that allowing illegal immigrants to have strong equal protection of 
the laws could be characterized as forcing the government to subsidize 
an illegal entrant's continued presence in the country.127 Moreover, 
concerns about a state's limited financial resources and its ability to 
provide quality government services to all of its lawful residents 
becomes a concern in a way not present when allowing illegal 
immigrants to remedy private wrongs. 
If these are the types of concerns driving the Supreme Court's 
distinction between legal and illegal immigrants, however, it appears that 
there is not so much something inherently relevant and wrong about an 
immigrant's unlawful status when deciding the scope of protection to 
123 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1449. 
124 Hampton Y. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102 (1976) (footnote omitted). 
125 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1450. 
126 See Montoya y. Gateway Ins. Co., 401 A.2d 1102, 1106 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Diy. 1979) 
("Should defendants be held liable on the policy, the State would not be subsidizing and indeed 
aiding the alien to continue his illegal presence in this country. Rather, an insurance company 
compensated for the risks it described and assumed would be paying in accord with its agreement. "). 
127 [d. 
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offer him or her under U.S. laws. Rather, the Plyler Court's real 
justification for its distinction would then appear to be economic in 
nature. As discussed earlier, the Court had listed a state's interest in 
preserving its economic resources for those legally residing within its 
borders l28 as a reason why courts should apply a weaker level of review 
to state classifications of illegal immigrants. 129 The Court used this 
economic justification, however, as an independent and separate 
rationale for treating illegal immigrants differently, not simply as a way 
to further support its claim that illegal status, standing alone, somehow 
makes a constitutional difference. Moreover, traditionally the Supreme 
Court has held that an asserted state interest in preserving limited 
financial resources for citizens is not a sufficiently compelling 
justification for an alienage classification. 13o Indeed, the Supreme Court 
has declared that: "Since an alien as well as a citizen is a 'person' for 
equal-protection purposes, a concern for fiscal integrity is [not a] 
compelling ... justification for the questioned classification in these 
cases .... ,,131 Therefore, even in the context of an economic 
justification, we again return to the undeveloped idea that there is 
something fundamentally important and relevant about an illegal 
immigrant's unlawful status in the equal-protection arena but not other 
areas of the law. 
Another difference between the cases discussed above and Plyler 
that may have influenced the Court's thinking is that the former group of 
cases involved primarily statutory or common law rights and remedies 
while Plyler involved constitutional doctrine. It is not clear, however, 
what difference this should make. The Court did not provide any 
guidance on this point. Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause 
addresses itself to all persons in the United States' jurisdiction, making it 
less likely, as a constitutional matter, that an illegal immigrant's unlawful 
status should be relevant to equal-protection doctrine. 
Ironically, one possible explanation for the Plyler Court's view of 
the relevancy of an immigrant's unlawful status may be the mounting 
public hostility toward illegal immigrants over the last few decades. 
Illegal immigrants are a politically unpopular class. Thus, while a 
128 See Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 225-26 (1982). 
129 As the discussion in Part IlLB reveals, the Plyler Court's economic justification for 
distinguishing between legal and illegal immigrants does not stand up to a number of empirical 
studies that have been conducted since the time the case was decided. These studies have found that 
illegal immigrants make substantial economic contributions to their local communities and to the 
nation as well. 
130 Wishnie, supra note 23, at 505-06. 
131 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 375 (1971). 
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number of lower courts were willing to overlook these individuals' 
violations of the country's immigration laws, legal realism would suggest 
that the Supreme Court may have felt uncomfortable doing so when 
Plyler was decided in 1982, a period in which animus toward illegal 
immigration was beginning to flourish. 132 The irony, of course, is that 
one of the major purposes behind the Equal Protection Clause is to 
protect the rights of unpopular and vulnerable groups. 133 
2. Examining and Responding to Scholarly Justifications 
Even though the Court did not explicitly articulate a reason for 
treating unlawful status as relevant in the equal-protection context but 
not in others, scholars have stepped in to fill this void. Professors 
Michael Perry and Peter Schuck argue in favor of limiting the 
constitutional rights and benefits accorded to noncitizens. These 
arguments could be used to support and justify the Court's more 
restrictive holding in Plyler (and against the more liberal holding with 
respect to undocumented children and their access to education). By 
addressing them, I aim to reveal their faults and urge that they be 
disregarded if and when the Court decides to readdress the question of 
the level of scrutiny applicable to illegal-immigrant classifications. 
While discussing the Court's treatment of illegal immigrants in 
Plyler, Michael Perry has argued that noncitizen status, both legal and 
illegal, is a morally relevant factor when discussing what he identifies as 
the principle behind equal-protection law.134 He posits: "It is tempting 
to say, in a generous if unreflective spirit of egalitarianism, that a 
person's status as an alien indicates nothing about the worth or desert of 
the person. But such a statement would be problematic. Alienage is 
conventionally, if implicitly, regarded as a morally relevant status.,,135 
J32 See, e.g., Immigration Refonn and Control Act of 1986, 8 V.S.C.A. § 1324a (Westlaw 
2007). 
133 See Romer v. Evans, 517 V.S. 620,634 (1996); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 
V.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938). 
134 Perry, supra note 46, at 334; see also Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A 
Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1061 (1979). According to Perry, "the 
moral worth or status of a person is detennined by the nature and extent of the person's activities, 
native talents, acquired skills, and need." Michael J. Perry, The Principle of Equal Protection, 32 
HASTINGS LJ. 1133, 1138 (1981). If"a factor is not a detenninant ofa person's moral status - if the 
factor does not itself refer to or indicate anything about a person's activities, talents, skills, or needs 
- then that factor is morally irrelevant" and thus should not be used by a state as a basis for 
detennining who is more or less deserving of respect and concern. Id. at 1138-39. 
135 Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1061 (1979). Interestingly, Perry makes this observation with respect to legal 
immigrants even though he concedes that "a person's status as an alien is [notl, without more, a 
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He further argues that even if legal-immigrant status could be 
characterized as immaterial, "a person's status, not as an alien, but as one 
who is illegally present in the territorial jurisdiction in question -
indicating as it does that particular acts, acts contrary to law, have been 
committed - does not seem to be a problematic basis for differential 
treatment.,,136 The weakness of Perry's claims, however, is that they 
draw their moral strength from questionable sources of morality: the 
United States Constitutionl37 and the importance of the concept of 
formal, national citizenship.138 
Perry contends that the Supreme Court should not be able to "deem 
alienage to be a morally irrelevant status when to do that would be to 
deny the validity of something the Constitution itself does, namely, treat 
aliens and citizens differently for many purposes.,,139 An initial objection 
to this position is that it is not clear why the Constitution is being 
employed as a source of moral relevancy. A further objection is that, 
while it is true that the Constitution does, at times, treat aliens and 
citizens differently, it is also true that several of the Constitution's 
provisions are addressed to all persons within the jurisdiction of the 
United States, not just to citizens. 14o The Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment is such a provision. 141 Indeed, it is even possible 
to view the Constitution as primarily about persons, with citizenship 
taking on significance only "in particular situations as a special case.,,142 
reliable indicator of particular choices, activities, talents, or skills," the set of factors that he uses to 
determine whether certain characteristics of classes of persons are morally irrelevant and thus 
impermissible distinctions with which to justify state discrimination under the Equal Protection 
Clause. [d. at 1066. 
136 Perry, supra note 46, at 335. 
137 [d. at 334; Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and 
Appraisal, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1066 (1979). 
138 Michael 1. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 
COLUM. L. REV. 1023, 1061 (1979). 
139 [d. at 1066. 
140 See. e.g., U.S. CON ST. amend. IV ("The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated .... "); 
U.S. CONST. amend. V ("No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury ... nor shall any person be subject for 
the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb .... "). 
141 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."). 
142 T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens. Aliens. Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. 
COMMENT. 9, 21 (1990) (discussing several clauses within the Constitution which identified its 
beneficiaries as persons or did not identify a specific beneficiary at all); see also ALEXANDER 
BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 54 (1975) ("[T]he concept of citizenship plays only the most 
minimal role in the American constitutional scheme."). 
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Thus, the mere fact that the Constitution draws some distinctions 
between citizens and noncitizens does not mean, as Perry asserts, that it 
"limits the jurisdiction of the principles of equal protection.,,143 
Perry also argues, in a related manner, that the value and existence 
of formal citizenship in American society provides further support for the 
view that noncitizen status must be a morally relevant factor in the equal-
protection context. According to Perry, a person, in at least some 
respects, "is more deserving by virtue of his status as a citizen than a 
person who is not a citizen."I44 Again, an initial objection to this 
position is that Perry does not offer any support for his view that formal 
citizenship, as opposed to some other vision of the sphere of moral 
relevance such as notions of membership145 or personhood,146 is the 
appropriate community with which to judge the morality of a state's 
relationship with those in its jurisdiction. As Part III argues below, a 
strong case can be made for a membership or participation model of 
rights, rather than one that revolves around the primacy of formal 
citizenship. A second problem with the significance that Perry attaches 
to citizenship is that he incorrectly contends that alienage must be a 
morally relevant consideration "unless one is prepared to abolish the 
status of citizenship.,,147 
Despite Perry's concerns, it is possible to have a coherent system of 
rights that recognizes both the legal significance of formal citizenship 
and the moral importance of a noncitizens' membership within a 
community. Take political rights as an example. Today the right to 
serve as an elected official and to vote in elections is typically limited to 
citizens. Creating a subset of individuals within the United States that 
can run for office and vote, however, "does not entail that persons 
outside the subset are non-members" of American society, undeserving 
of several of the important rights and benefits accorded to citizens. 148 
143 Perry, supra note 46, at 334. 
144 Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1061 (1979). Perry elaborates on this point by reasoning that: "The concept 
of citizenship itself implies the existence of a central favored group; laws favoring citizens express 
primary respect and concern for one's own 'family' or 'club.'" Id. 
145 See. e.g., Joseph H. Carens, On Belonging: What We Owe People Who Stay, BOSTON 
REV., Summer 2005, at I, available at http://bostonreview.netlBR30.3/carens.html. 
146 See, e.g., Victor C. Romero, Expanding the Circle of Membership by Reconstructing the 
"Alien ": Lessons from Social Psychology and the "Promise Enforcement Cases," 32 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM I, 24 (1998); Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional 
Community, 81 IOWA L. REV. 707, 715-17 (1996). 
147 Michael J. Perry, Modern Equal Protection: A Conceptualization and Appraisal, 79 
COLUM. L. REv. 1023, 1061 (1979). 
148 Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 22; see also Karst, supra note 82, at 25. 
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Valuing the role of citizenship in contemporary America is not the same 
as, and does not require, denying the moral significance of the 
contributions that noncitizens make to American society. 
A last critique of Perry's articulation of the principle of equal 
protection pertains to the importance that he places on illegal 
immigrants' presence in the United States in violation of the law. Perry, 
as well as the Plyler majority, subscribes to the view that by breaking the 
country's immigration laws, illegal immigrants are bereft of any 
legitimate expectation of receiving government benefits and the 
protection of the laws accorded citizens and legal immigrants. 149 This 
view, however, inaccurately stresses a static nature of morality. An 
individual's actions at one point in time should not permanently affect 
his moral standing or culpability at a later point in time. 150 This idea is 
consistent with the use of moral judgments in other familiar areas of the 
law such as the criminal justice system. Even though society may at one 
point find that it is just to punish an individual for a wrongful act,151 over 
time, most individuals who receive punishment are deemed to have 
sufficiently paid their debt to society. Their initial act, which was 
morally proscribed, is forgiven and no longer justifies their punishment 
by the state. Similarly, over time, an illegal immigrant's original 
condition of admission becomes morally irrelevant. 152 The longer that 
such an immigrant lives in the United States and becomes a productive 
member of American society, the more attenuated the moral significance 
of his or her initial unlawful entry into the country. 
Related to Perry's concerns, Peter Schuck has argued that giving too 
many rights and constitutional protections to legal immigrants, and a 
fortiori illegal immigrants, leads to a devaluation of American 
citizenship. 153 This devaluation, in turn, has significant "emotional 
consequences,,,154 which Schuck identifies as the weakening of formal 
citizenship's ability to serve as a "bond among individuals in a polygot 
society like ours in which there are relatively few other affective linkages 
149 See Perry, supra note 46, at 335; Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 219 (1982). 
ISO See Carens, supra note 145, at 11. 
lSI See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 16-18 (3d ed. 2001); Alison 
Dundes Renteln, A Justification of the Cultural Defense as Partial Excuse, 2 S. CAL. REv. L. & 
WOMEN'S STUD. 437,441-42 (1993); Jason H. Lee, Note, Dislocated and Deprived: A Normative 
Evaluation of Southeast Asian Criminal Responsibility and the Implications of Societal Fault, 11 
MICH. 1. RACE & L. 671, 695 (2006). 
IS2 Carens, supra note 145, at 11. 
IS) See Peter H. Schuck, Membership in the Liberal Polity: The Devaluation of American 
Citizenship, 3 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 13 (1989). 
1S4 Id. at 14. 
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or commonalities.,,155 This view highlights citizenship's ability to 
signify a national community and build national consensus on important 
political issues. 156 
Providing illegal immigrants strong equal protection of the laws, 
and thus implying their entitlement to receive several of the same 
benefits as citizens, however, does not negatively affect citizenship's 
ability to serve as a unifying force for those who possess it. The mere 
fact that an illegal immigrant is provided the right to receive health-care 
benefits or some other government service does not mean that an 
American citizen will feel any less connected to a national American 
community if, in fact, one can fairly be said to exist. 157 Moreover, I 
agree with Alexander Aleinikoff that there is something "distasteful" 
about afflicting a harm on certain individuals or excluding them from 
benefits accorded to others in order to make the non-afflicted and 
included "feel special.,,158 Finally, it is not clear at all why a national 
community should necessarily center around citizenship. Instead, it 
seems perfectly possible, and more logical, to develop a communitarian 
ethos "among all persons living and working within the territory of the 
United States.,,159 The bond amongst citizens created by their shared 
American nationality, standing alone, is weakl60 and thus does not serve 
as a solid springboard from which to develop a sense of belonging in 
America. In a sense, then, the strength of the various sub-national 
affiliations that Schuck identifies as potentially divisive forces - "ethnic, 
wealth, gender, religious, and lingual differences" 161 - highlights the 
impracticality, and more importantly, the impropriety of seeking to form 
a national community grounded on citizenship. Ironically, given the 
importance and power of certain sub-national affiliations to those living 
within the United States, it may make more sense to construct a national 
community in a way that acknowledges and leverages the power of these 
more tangible ties rather than depending principally on the typically 
distant commonality of citizenship. 
Both Perry and Schuck present arguments in support of limiting the 
constitutional rights and government benefits made available to illegal 
immigrants. In this way, their contentions provide possible justifications 
for the Plyler Court's decision to treat unlawful status as a constitutional 
155 Id. 
156 See id. at 14-15. 
157 See Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 28-29. 
158 Id. at 28. 
159 Id. at 30. 
160 Id. at 30-31. 
161 Schuck, supra note 153, at 14. 
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relevancy. As this section's discussion has begun to make clear, 
however, Perry's and Schuck's views should not be accorded too much 
weight, as they do not offer a satisfactory justification for the denial of 
strong equal-protection rights to illegal immigrants, especially given the 
harmful consequences that such a denial entails. 
C. THE IMPORTANCE OF CLOSE JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND RELIANCE ON 
STRONG EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS FOR ILLEGAL 
IMMIGRANTS 
Regardless of the reason, or lack thereof, for the Supreme Court's 
finding that undocumented status is constitutionally relevant in the equal-
protection context, there are a number of important reasons why the 
Court should adopt the view of the several other courts162 that have 
overlooked an individual's immigration status when determining the 
scope of the protection of the laws. First, as Gerald Neuman has pointed 
out, holding classifications of illegal immigrants to a less-stringent 
standard of review than those of legal immigrants may very well convert 
the undocumented population into a community of outlaws living within 
our borders. 163 This result seems patently unacceptable under any notion 
of respect for individuals' dignity and humanity underlying the Equal 
Protection Clause. 164 It would treat illegal immigrants as nonpersons 
"beyond the effective protection of the laws" and subject to abuse by all 
but assistance by none. 165 Proposition 187, passed by the California 
electorate in 1994, is just one sign that this fear of turning illegal 
immigrants into outlaws is not merely a hypothetical matter. 166 Although 
the law was ultimately found to be preempted by the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, it 
aggressively sought to deny illegal immigrants access to social services, 
health care, and public education. 167 
A second reason that the Supreme Court should reevaluate its 
position that undocumented status is a relevant consideration in the 
equal-protection context is that the Equal Protection Clause recognizes 
the humanity of illegal immigrants in a way that preemption doctrine, the 
other major tool that illegal immigrants can use to try to invalidate 
162 See discussion of cases in Part II.A. 
163 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1447-48. 
164 [d. at 1448; Karst, supra note 82, at 4-8. 
165 Neuman, supra note 46, at 1447-48. 
166 [d. at 1448. 
167 League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 997 F. Supp. 1244, 1266 (C.D. Cal. 
1997). 
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discriminatory state classifications, does not. The protection of an 
individual's rights under the Equal Protection Clause acknowledges his 
personhood and right to basic support by the state in a way that the 
preemption analysis' focus on federalism issues and constitutional 
structure ignores. 168 As Harold Koh, Dean of Yale Law School, has 
argued in stressing the importance of legal immigrants' abilities to utilize 
the full force of the Equal Protection Clause: 
I prefer an equal protection approach to a preemption approach, not 
simply because it clearly separates what is constitutional from what 
federal policy makers happen to think is wise, but more 
fundamentally, because it answers, in a way that preemption reasoning 
does not, the moral and philosophical claims that resident aliens make 
. h' 169 agamst t elr state governments. 
The same argument applies to illegal immigrants, whose personhood is 
often devalued by discriminatory state laws, and who participate daily as 
members of American society in a productive and oftentimes similar way 
as citizens and legal immigrants. 17o 
According undocumented immigrants strong equal-protection rights 
is also important because preemption sometimes fails as an alternative 
strategy. A recent example is Equal Access Education v. Merten, in 
which a federal district court found that a blanket policy of Virginia post-
secondary educational institutions denying admission to illegal 
immigrants was not preempted by the exclusively federal authority to 
regulate immigration.171 In another example, in 2004, a federal district 
judge in Arizona concluded that Arizona's Proposition 200,172 which 
effectively prohibits all agencies in the state from administering "state 
and local public benefits [to illegal immigrants] that are not federally 
168 See Koh, supra note 25, at 98-99; Wishnie, supra note 23, at 511 n.96 ("Critics have 
responded persuasively that preemption analysis leads to a 'hollow formalism' that denies the 
equality and anticaste force of the equal protection analysis."). 
169 Koh, supra note 52, at 99. 
170 See discussion infra, Part III.B. 
171 Equal Access Educ. v. Merten, 305 F. Supp. 2d 585, 608 (E.D. Va. 2004). The post-
secondary institutions named in the complaint included George Mason University, James Madison 
University, Northern Virginia Community College, the University of Virginia, Virginia 
Commonwealth University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech), and 
the ColIege of William and Mary. Id. at 592. Denial of admission of undocumented applicants was 
encouraged by the Attorney General of Virginia. See ALISON P. LANDRY, COMMONWEALTH OF 
VIRGINIA, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, IMMIGRATION LAW COMPLIANCE UPDATE 
MEMORANDUM, Sept. 5, 2002, available at www.schev.edulAdminFaculty/lmmigrationMemo9-5-
02APL.pdf. 
172 The full text of the proposition as presented to Arizona voters in 2004 is available at 
http://www.azsos.gov/electionl2004/infolPubPamphletienglishiprop200.pdf. 
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mandated,,,173 was not precluded by the federal preemption doctrine 
elaborated by the Supreme Court in De Canas v. Bica. 174 Strong equal-
protection rights would allow undocumented immigrants to challenge the 
admissions policies of Virginia's public, post-secondary educational 
institutions. It would also allow them to fight for access to the myriad of 
other rights and benefits that the doctrine of preemption cannot 
safeguard, such as those regulated by Arizona's Proposition 200. 
The Supreme Court should reject the distinction between legal and 
illegal immigrants that it recognized in Plyler. It has failed to identify a 
principled reason for claiming the relevancy of unlawful status in the 
equal-protection sphere but not in other areas of the law. This failure is 
particularly questionable given the important reasons for granting illegal 
immigrants strong protections of the law and for treating them, like legal 
immigrants, as a suspect class when dealing with equal-protection 
claims. 
III. THE PARTICIPATION MODEL OF RIGHTS: ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS AS 
MEMBERS OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 
The claim that illegal immigrants should receive the same level of 
equal protection of the laws as legal immigrants gains further, normative 
support from the application of a participation model of rights. 175 In 
what follows, this article will layout the values and mechanics behind 
the participation model. It will then apply this model to the case of 
illegal immigrants. 
A. THE PARTICIPATION MODEL DEFINED 
The participation model of rights is relatively straightforward. It is 
premised on the idea that membership in a community is what matters 
morally when it comes to the distribution of most Constitutional 
protections and government benefits. 176 Textually, it is consistent with 
173 Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 46-140.01(A) (West law 2007). 
174 Friendly House v. Napolitano, CV 04-649 TUC DCB, at 28 (D. Ariz. Nov. 20, 2004); see 
also 10shua 1. Herndon, Broken Borders: De Canas v. Bica and the Standards that Govern the 
Validity oj State Measures Designed to Deter Undocumented Immigration, 12 TEX. HISP. 1.L. & 
POL'y 31, 82-91 (2006) (discussing the district court's analysis of the preemption issue in Friendly 
House v. Napolitano). 
175 See A Theory oj Alien's Rights, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1292, 1292 (1983); Carens, supra note 
145, at 10-11; see also AleinikotT, supra note 142, at 20-22. 
176 Carens, supra note 145, at 6; see also Peter L. Reich, Public Benefits Jor Undocumented 
Aliens: State Law into the Breach Once More, 21 N.M. L. REv. 219, 247 (1991) (discussing the 
moral claim to benefits that illegal immigrants have due to their "contributions to economic growth 
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the Constitution's explicit provision of several important rights to 
persons (as opposed to citizens), as well as its declaration of other major 
rights without identifying any specific beneficiary. 177 
The driving force behind a participation based model has been 
explained by political scientist Joseph Carens in the following manner: 
Whatever their legal status, individuals who live in a society over an 
extended period oftime become members of that society, as their lives 
intertwine with the lives of others there. These human bonds provide 
the basic contours of the rights that a state must guarantee; they cannot 
be regarded as a matter of political discretion. 178 
This view focuses on the social and economic interaction that an 
individual has with the society that he or she lives in when determining a 
claim to the protection of that society's laws. 179 It stresses three related 
principles. First, an individual's legal status within a country (e.g., 
citizen, legal permanent resident, undocumented immigrant) is not the 
fairest or most morally significant criterion with which to adjudge his or 
her claim to rightS. 180 Second, the more an individual contributes to the 
society that he or she lives in, the more he or she deserves to receive in 
terms of rights and benefits. The participation model "correlates rights 
with social and economic involvement.,,181 Third, the more an individual 
acts like a citizen, the more he or she deserves to be treated like a citizen 
by the state. 
Of course, in making the argument in favor of a participation model 
and social stability" in the United States). 
177 See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech .... "); U.S. 
CON ST. amend. XIV ("[N]or shall any state ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws."); Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 21. But see Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 
634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Constitution itself recognizes a basic difference 
between citizens and aliens."). 
178 Carens, supra note 145, at I. 
179 The Rights o/Undocumented Aliens, supra note 75, at 1453. 
180 See David Held, Between State and Civil Society: Citizenship, in CITIZENSHIP 19, 20 
(Geoff Andrew ed., 1991) (stressing the importance of "social participation" and involvement of 
people in the community in which they live when defining the concept of citizenship); Bryan S. 
Turner, Postmodern Culture/Modern Citizens, in THE CONDITION OF CITIZENSHIP 153, 159 (Bart 
Van Steenbergen ed., 1994) ("Citizenship can be defined as a set of practices which constitute 
individuals as competent members of a community. This definition involves a sociological 
orientation because it avoids an emphasis on juridical or political definitions of citizenship."); see 
also Schuck supra note 153, at 17 ("[T]he conception of membership that drives political institutions 
has steadily grown more fluid, functional, and context-dependent and seems likely to become even 
more so in the future."). 
181 The Rights o/Undocumented Aliens, supra note 75, at 1453. 
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of rights, I recognize that there are a number of citizens who contribute 
very little to the country that they live in, yet are still accorded the full 
panoply of rights that their country has to offer by dint of their 
citizenship in that country. Indeed, many citizens contribute negatively 
to the society that they are a part of by, for example, engaging in criminal 
acts. The participation theory of rights advocated in this article, 
however, relates specifically to the moral claims of those individuals 
excluded from the full set of rights that a nation offers its citizens. As 
such, this article is not arguing that everyone, including citizens, living in 
the United States should receive rights commensurate to the amount and 
type of social and economic contributions that they make to American 
society. Rather, it is presenting a moral argument in support of 
noncitizens' claims - including immigrants both legally and illegally in 
the United States - to a larger set of rights and benefits that have 
traditionally been limited to those with citizenship status. More 
specifically, it is arguing that illegal immigrants should receive the same 
Constitutional rights as legal immigrants who, as a class, have been 
accorded strict-scrutiny protection under the Equal Protection Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Moreover, it is true that the Constitution rightfully treats citizenship 
as a special requirement for some rights and purposes. As noted earlier, 
the rights to vote and hold public office have been limited to citizens. 182 
However, as Alexander Aleinikoff has pointed out when supporting the 
extension of membership rights to legal immigrants, "one can understand 
constitutional membership as extending to all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the United States even if the document privileges 
citizenship in certain respects.,,183 Limiting the pool of individuals that 
can vote and run for office does not lead to the conclusion that those 
persons excluded from this pool are non-members of American society. 
Formal citizenship and membership in a community are distinct 
concepts. Each confers a different set of rights on its constituents, and 
both can co-exist with one another. 
B. THE PARTICIPATION MODEL ApPLIED 
Some commentators have observed that, in its line of alienage cases 
addressing classifications of legal immigrants, the Supreme Court has 
182 Some have argued that even these rights should be extended to noncitizens as well. See. 
e.g.. Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote, 75 MICH. L. REV. 
1092 (1977); Bryant Yuan Fu Yang, Note, Fightingfor an Equal Voice: Past and Present Struggle 
for Noncitizen Enfranchisement, 13 ASIAN AM. L.J. 57 (2006). 
183 AleinikofT, supra note 142, at 22. 
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already appeared, at times, to adopt the participation model of rights. 184 
Indeed, in Graham v. Richardson, the Court struck down a statute that 
sought to exclude permanent resident aliens from state welfare 
programs. 185 In doing so, it noted that legal immigrants, like citizens, 
pay taxes, are subject to the military draft, may live and work in a state 
for several years, and contribute to a state's economy through the 
purchasing and producing of goods. 186 Tacitly endorsing the 
participation model, the Court recognized that "in day-to-day 
terms, permanently residing aliens and citizens are . . . virtually 
indistinguishable,,187 and thus determined that legal immigrants should be 
accorded virtually the same set of rights and benefits as citizens. 188 
The same logic that drove the Court's holding in Graham, which 
exemplifies the participation theory of rights, should be applied to the 
equal-protection analysis of illegal-immigrant classifications as well. In 
nearly all respects, except for their immigration status, illegal immigrants 
interact daily as members of American society in ways almost 
indistinguishable from most legal immigrants and citizens. This is 
significant for two reasons. First, it supports the idea that illegal 
immigrants should be given several of the same rights and benefits as 
citizens and legal immigrants because similarly situated people should be 
treated similarly by the laws of a state. This notion is consistent with the 
norms underlying equal-protection doctrine. 189 Second, similarity among 
citizens, legal immigrants, and illegal immigrants supports a fairness 
argument in favor of the irrelevancy of unlawful status in the equal-
protection realm because, through their daily actions as members of 
American society, illegal immigrants have helped contribute to the 
vibrancy of their local communities and paid for many of the government 
benefits (through taxes) that states have tried to take away from them. 190 
07. 
184 Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 23-24; A Theory of Alien's Rights, supra note 175, at 1303-
185 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971). 
186 1d. 
187 Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 23; see also In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 722 (1973) 
("Resident aliens, like citizens, pay taxes, support the economy, serve in the Armed Forces, and 
contribute in myriad other ways to our society. It is appropriate that a State bear a heavy burden 
when it deprives them of employment opportunities."); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 645 
(1973). 
188 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 376. 
189 Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctf., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) ("The Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment ... is essentially a direction that all persons similarly situated should 
be treated alike."); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). 
190 See, e.g., JULIAN L. SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 296 (1989); 
Michael A. Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs, State Rights, and Alienage 
Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 217, 231-32 (1994); Reich, supra note 176, at 244-46. 
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In this sense, allowing states to discriminate against illegal immigrants 
under rational-basis review is unfair because illegal immigrants have 
actually paid for part, if not all, of the benefits that they are being denied. 
In what follows, I will briefly demonstrate the different ways that illegal 
immigrants act as economic and social members of the United States and 
thus have a moral claim to the same level of constitutional protections as 
legal immigrants. 
As discussed above, illegal immigrants contribute to the local 
economies in which they live, as well as the national economy, in a 
variety of ways identical to those in which legal immigrants and citizens 
do. They work, oftentimes in jobs that others in the country do not wish 
to occupyl91 and in ways that result in subsidiary job creation;'92 they pay 
taxes; and they also contribute to economic expansion by acting as 
consumers. 193 Today, an estimated one in twenty-five workers in the 
United States is an illegal immigrant. 194 In California, which has by far 
the largest illegal immigrant population in the country, roughly eight 
percent of workers are undocumented. 195 Contrary to common 
misperceptions, the majority of these immigrants do not work under the 
table for labor contractors on farms or for small construction 
companies. l96 Rather, they receive regular wages and year-end W-2 
forms, and are employed by some of the nation's largest and best-known 
companies. 197 
191 According to the Pew Hispanic Center, twelve percent of workers in the food-preparation 
industry are illegal immigrants, and "more than a quarter of a million illegal immigrants are janitors, 
350,000 are maids and housekeepers and 300,000 are groundskeepers." Eduardo Porter, Here 
Illegal/y, Working Hard and Paying Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, June 19,2006, at l. 
192 See, e.g., JAMES J. KIELKOPF, HISPANIC ADVOCACY AND COMMUNITY EMPOWERMENT 
THROUGH RESEARCH, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS IN MINNESOTA 2 
(2000), available at www.hacer-
mn.orgldownloads/English_ReportslEconomicImpactUndocumentedWorkers.pdf ("Up to 50,000 
Minnesotans owe their jobs to the presence of undocumented labor in the industries that were 
studied. On average, every undocumented worker that is removed from the economy causes another 
worker somewhere in Minnesota to lose his or her job."). 
193 Francine J. Lipman, The Taxation of Undocumented Immigrants: Separate, Unequal, and 
Without Representation, 9 HARV. LATINO L. REV. I, 3 (2006). According to the Pew Research 
Center, illegal immigrants add 600,000 to 700,000 new consumers to the economy each year. 
LEAGUE OF UNITED LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS, ECONOMIC IMPACT OF UNDOCUMENTED 
IMMIGRANTS, http://www.lulac.orgladvocacylissueslimmigrationltruth.html (last visited Apr. 4, 
2008). 
194 JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 9. Some have found this proportion of illegal immigrant 
workers to be even higher at one out of every twenty workers in the United States. Porter, supra 
note 191,at l. 




Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 39, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol39/iss1/1
2008] EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ILLEGAL IMMIGRANTS 35 
With respect to taxes, which help to fund government benefits, 
studies have found that illegal immigrants pay billions of dollars 
annually in all kinds of taxes, including sales, excise, property, income, 
and payrol1. '98 At the federal level, illegal immigrants make payments 
into benefits programs that they are not even lawfully permitted to draw 
on such as Social Security, Medicare, and unemployment insurance 
programs. 199 Much of the $7 billion in the Social Security 
Administration's suspense file200 is believed to have been contributed by 
illegal immigrants.2o, Thus, illegal immigrants help subsidize a number 
of popular government benefits that millions of citizens enjoy each year. 
At the state level, recent estimates have identified illegal-immigrant tax 
contributions in the hundreds of millions of dollars annually, even where 
the local undocumented populations in these states were relatively 
smal1.202 While the research is inconclusive, a significant body of 
empirical studies has found that illegal immigrants pay enough in taxes 
to cover the costs of the social services that they use203 and, in some 
circumstances, have even contributed to a net fiscal gain for local 
econornies.204 Even in cases where a study found that the cost of services 
198 Lipman, supra note 193, at 5. 
199 Id. at 3-4. 
200 The Social Security Administration suspense file keeps track of the amount of wages that 
are taxed for collection but not credited to a specific worker. It serves as a proxy for the tax 
contributions made by illegal immigrants who often provide employers with false social security 
numbers. 
201 Anna Quindlen, Undocumented. Indispensable, NEWSWEEK, May 15, 2006, at 78. 
202 See. e.g., SARAH BETH COFFEY, GEORGIA BUDGET AND POLICY INSTITUTE, 
UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS IN GEORGIA: TAX CONTRIBUTION AND FISCAL CONCERNS I (2006), 
available at http://www.gbpi.org/pubs/garevenue/20060119.pdf; OREGON CENTER FOR PUBLIC 
POLICY, ISSUE BRIEF: UNDOCUMENTED WORKERS ARE TAXPAYERS, TOO I (rev. ed. Apr. 10,2007), 
available at http://www .ocpp.org/2007 !issue07041 Oimmigranttaxeseng.pdf. 
203 See. e.g., Howard F. Chang, Liberalized Immigration as Free Trade: Economic Welfare 
and the Optimal Immigration Policy, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1197 (1997); Lipman, supra note 
193, at 2; Reich, supra note 176, at 244-46; Sidney Weintraub, Illegal Immigrants in Texas: Impact 
on Social Services and Related Considerations, 18 INT'L MIG. REV. 733, 745 (1984); Derrick Z. 
Jackson, Undocumented Workers Contribute Plenty, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 12, 2006, at 13 
("Analysts at Standard & Poor's wrote last week that there is no clear correlation between 
undocumented families and local costs, as the states with the highest number of such families also 
have relatively low unemployment rates, high property values, and strong income growth .... "). 
But see ROBIN BAKER & RICH JONES, THE BELL POLICY CENTER, STATE AND LOCAL TAXES PAID IN 
COLORADO BY UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS I (2006); DENNIS PROUTY, IOWA LEGISLATIVE 
SERVICES AGENCY FISCAL SERVICES, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS' COST TO THE STATE 2-3 
(2007) (noting that "legal residents are subsidizing illegal residents to some extent"). 
204 SIMON, THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF IMMIGRATION 296; Larry J. Obhof, The 
Irrationality of Enforcement? An Economic Analysis of u.s. Immigration Law, 12 KAN. J.L. & PUB. 
POL'y 163, 175-76 (2003); Olivas, Preempting Preemption: Foreign Affairs. State Rights. and 
Alienage Classifications, 35 VA. J. INT'L L., at 227 ("[A] fair review of all the evidence shows that 
undocumented aliens are, by the most reliable studies, a net gain for the economy, even if not for the 
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used by illegal immigrants exceeded their tax contributions to state and 
local coffers, they noted that this difference tended to be rather small,205 
or at least a lot smaller than critics of illegal immigration would make it 
appear. Moreover, to the extent that some illegal immigrants are using 
more in services than what they contribute in taxes, they are behaving 
just like many citizens. The Public Policy Institute of California has 
noted that, due to the costs of public education, "most U.S. native 
families with children probably receive more in services ... than they 
pay in taxes.,,206 
In addition to their role as economic actors in America, the longer 
illegal immigrants remain in the United States, the stronger their social 
and cultural connections become with the country, its way of life, and its 
people?07 It is in this sense that they also have a moral claim to a wide 
range of rights and strong constitutional protections as members of 
American society.208 Scholars from varying disciplines have argued that 
immigrants living in the United States often end up developing 
significant ties to and identities defined by their experiences in America, 
even while maintaining some degree of connection with their countries 
of origin.209 As noted by sociologist Peter Kivisto when discussing his 
formulation of "transnational social spaces": 
[P]lace counts .... Contrary to the image of transnational immigrants 
living simultaneously in two worlds, in fact the vast majority is at any 
moment located primarily in one place. If the location where they 
spend most of their day-to-day lives is the receiving country, then over 
polity .... "). 
205 See, e.g., BAKER & JONES, supra note 203, at I ("All together, undocumented immigrant 
tax payments are equal to 70 to 86 percent of the state and local governments' costs for providing 
federally mandated services."). But see Edward Sifuentes, Researchers Disagree on fIlegal 
Immigrant Cost-Benefit Analysis, NORTH COUNTY TIMES, Aug. 12, 2006, 
http://www.nctimes.comlarticlesI2006/08/13/newsltop_storiesl2l_52_058_12_06.txt (noting that 
some studies funded by conservative think tanks have found that illegal immigrants cost taxpayers 
significantly more in the public services that they use than they contribute in taxes). 
206 JOHNSON, supra note 12, at 9-10. 
207 See Leo R. Chavez, Outside the Imagined Community: Undocumented Settlers and 
Experiences of Incorporation, 18 AM. ETHNOLOGIST 257, 269 (1991) ("[T]he longer undocumented 
immigrants reside in the United States, regardless of their motivations for migration and despite their 
lack of documentation, the stronger and more numerous their ties to it become."); Carens, supra note 
145, at I. 
208 Carens, supra note 145, at 11. 
209 See, e.g., Linda Bosniak, Citizenship Denationalized, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 447, 
484 (2000) (within the context of describing citizenship as identity or solidarity); Chavez, supra note 
207, at 267-69; Peter Kivisto, Theorizing Transnational Immigration: A Critical Review of Current 
Efforts, 24 ETHNIC & RACIAL STUD. 549, 571-72 (2001). 
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time the issues and concerns of that place will tend to take precedence 
over the more removed issues and concerns ofthe homeland?lO 
The roots that illegal immigrants establish in the United States, as 
well as the social roles that they play in their communities, represent 
another dimension in which they are active participants in American 
society, deserving of similar treatment as all other members. 
It has been suggested by some commentators that the Supreme 
Court has actually showed signs that it is willing to adopt a participation 
model of rights with respect to the equal protection of illegal 
imrnigrants.211 Alexander Aleinikoffidentifies, as an example, the Plyler 
majority, which, despite its declaration that undocumented status is not a 
constitutional irrelevancy, still applied an intermediate level of review to 
the Texas statute at issue in that case. He argues that the Plyler analysis 
can be interpreted as "grounded in the recognition that undocumented 
children were likely to be permanent members of American society.,,212 
Indeed, as noted earlier in this article, in striking down Texas's 
discriminatory statute seeking to exclude undocumented children from 
public schools, the Court hinted several times at the fact that 
undocumented children are, and will continue to be, a part of American 
society regardless of whether they are provided a free public 
education.213 
Despite such an optimistic view of the Plyler majority's 
implementation of a participation model of rights, however, the Court's 
opinion was full of language suggesting that its endorsement of a 
participation theory, if it even adopted one, was extremely limited. The 
degree of significance attached by the Plyler Court to illegal immigrants' 
contributions to, and membership in, American society was restricted to 
undocumented children, whom the Court did not hold morally culpable 
for their unlawful presence in the country.214 The Court had a much 
different view of the parents of these children and other adult illegal 
Id. 
210 Kivisto, supra note 209, at 571. 
211 See, e.g., Aleinikoff, supra note 142, at 25. 
212 1d. 
2!3 Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). The Court noted that: 
[T)he record is clear that many of the undocumented children disabled by this classification 
will remain in this country indefinitely, and that some will become lawful residents or 
citizens of the United States. It is difficult to understand precisely what the State hopes to 
achieve by promoting the creation and perpetuation of a subclass of illiterates within our 
boundaries, surely adding to the problems and costs of unemployment, welfare, and crime. 
214 Bosniak, supra note 47, at 1123. 
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immigrants, suggesting that their choices to violate the nation's 
immigration laws singled them out as less entitled to the protection of the 
states' laws.2I5 Unlike the district court opinion in the matter,216 it did 
not recognize the degree to which adult illegal immigrants are members 
of the national community. 
However, while the Supreme Court may not yet have fully 
embraced a participation model of illegal immigrant rights, the above 
discussion suggests that it should. Illegal immigrants make significant 
contributions to their communities as active members of American 
society. In most economic and social respects, they are indistinguishable 
from legal immigrants and citizens. They pay taxes, work, send their 
kids to school, go to church, and shop just like everyone else in the 
country. In this way, they embody the principles that underlie the 
participation model of rights. Just as the Court has begun to subscribe to 
the participation model when it comes to the rights of legal immigrants, 
it should employ the participation model in its treatment of illegal-
immigrant classifications as well. 
This extension of the participation model to the equal-protection 
doctrine's treatment of illegal immigrants is consistent with the principle 
of equal citizenship that Professor Kenneth Karst powerfully identified 
as the substantive core of the Equal Protection Clause. To Karst, "[t]he 
essence of equal citizenship," and thus the Equal Protection Clause, "is 
the dignity of full membership in ... society.,,217 This view stresses that 
an individual should "be treated by the organized society as a respected, 
responsible, and participating member.,,218 
While Karst does not speak specifically on the (ir)relevancy of 
undocumented status, he has used the concept of equal citizenship to 
argue that classifications of noncitizens generally should be viewed by 
the Court with suspicion, and has posited that equal citizenship "is 
broader than the legal status of citizenship.,,219 Indeed, "the broader 
215 Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220. 
216 The district court in Plyler explicitly recognized the membership of several illegal 
immigrants within American society that made them worthy of receiving many of the same benefits 
as those with legal immigration and citizen status. It noted: 
[T]he subcategory of illegal aliens affected by section 21.031 consists of more or less settled 
families, who have established deeper roots in this country than the much more typical 
temporary worker. The plaintiff families in this suit, for example, have lived in Tyler for 
years and are likely to remain unless deported. The state has accepted their taxes and its 
citizens have profited by, perhaps even exploited, their labor. 
Doe v. Plyler, 458 F. Supp. 569, 591 (E.D. Tex. 1978), ajJ'd, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). 
217 Karst, supra note 82, at 5. 
218 1d. at 4. 
219 Id. at 25. 
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principle of equal citizenship extends its core values to noncitizens, 
because for most purposes they are members of our society :.220 Karst 
also approves of the Supreme Court's decision to strike down Texas's 
discriminatory statute in Plyler v. Doe,221 suggesting that an individual's 
unlawful status does not affect his claim to equal citizenship and the 
dignity of full membership in American society. In this sense, then, 
according illegal immigrants the same equal-protection rights as legal 
immigrants (close judicial scrutiny) is in accord with the substance of the 
Equal Protection Clause. Conversely, viewing unlawful· status as 
constitutionally relevant impermissibly denies illegal immigrants the 
respect, responsibility, and participation rights222 that they are morally 
and constitutionally entitled to enjoy. 
CONCLUSION 
With an estimated population of twelve million in 2006,223 the 
"shadow population" that the Plyler Court was so concerned about in 
1982 has grown dramatically in size. This has made it imperative to 
reexamine the declaration in Plyer that unlawful status is a 
constitutionally relevant consideration, which has led to the commonly 
accepted conclusion that state illegal-immigrant classifications are to be 
subjected to only rational-basis review.224 Since Plyler was decided, the 
United States has witnessed a steady increase in anti-illegal-immigrant 
sentiment as well as a proliferation of state and local laws denying basic 
economic and social benefits to illegal immigrants.225 This sentiment 
and these laws seek to deprive the undocumented population of some of 
the most basic elements of survival such as housing and health services. 
In this way, they also seek to deprive undocumented individuals of their 
humanity as well as the dignity of full membership in the communities in 
which they live, work, and interact every day. 
Under a rational-basis regime, illegal immigrants may soon be 
220 ld. at 45. 
221 KENNETH L. KARST, BELONGING IN AMERICA: EQUAL CITIZENSHIP AND THE 
CONSTITUTION 143-45 (1989). 
222 Karst, supra note 82, at 25. 
223 FEDERATION FOR AMERICAN IMMIGRATION REFORM, How MANY ILLEGAL ALIENS?, 
http://www.fairus.org/sitelPageServer?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecentersb8ca (last visited Apr. 
2,2008). 
224 See, e.g., Tarango v. State Indus. Ins. Sys., 25 P.3d 175, 182-83 (Nev. 2001); Am. G.!. 
Forum v. Miller, 267 Cal. Rptr. 371, 376 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990). 
225 See, e.g., Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sep. 21, 2006) (Illegal Immigration Relief 
Act Ordinance); Escondido, Ca., Ordinance 2006-38R (Oct. 18,2006) (Establishing Penalties for the 
Harboring of Illegal Aliens in the City of Escondido). 
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converted into an outlaw class within American society. This result is 
unacceptable under the anti-caste principles animating the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.226 It is also morally 
unacceptable when considering the fact that, aside from their unlawful 
presence in the United States, illegal immigrants are virtually 
indistinguishable in their activities from most citizens and legal 
immigrants. 
The Equal Protection Clause extends its protection to all persons 
within the Untied States jurisdiction. The broad sweep of this language 
is something for Americans to be proud of, as it underscores this nation's 
universalist commitment to the preservation of human dignity. The 
Supreme Court in Plyler v. Doe, however, incorrectly rendered a 
judgment that would allow illegal immigrants to be treated as 
nonpersons. Accordingly, the Court should reconsider its holding in that 
case and recognize the constitutional irrelevancy of unlawful status. 
State classifications of illegal immigrants could then take their rightful 
place in the modem line of alienage cases declaring that state 
discrimination based on noncitizen status must be subjected to strict-
scrutiny review. 
226 Karst, supra note 82, at 6 ("The principle of equal citizenship ... presumptively forbids 
the organized society to treat an individual either as a member of an inferior or dependent caste or as 
a nonparticipant. "). 
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